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ABSTRACT 
The reference price, used by consumers to evaluate market prices, has tremendous relevance in 
dynamic pricing. Reconciling current heterogeneous theories and studies on reference prices, this 
paper analyzes the impact of hotel price sequences on consumers’ reference prices through a lab 
and a field experiment. Experiment 1 tests the importance of retrospective price evaluations, 
while Experiment 2 evaluates the impact of three forms of competition: (i) simultaneous 
behavior, where firms adjust prices simultaneously; (ii) leader-follower behavior, where one firm 
acts as the leader; and (iii) independent behavior, where each player takes its rival’s strategy as 
given and seeks to maximize its own profits. The results show that consumers decrease their 
reference price when competing hotels adjust their prices simultaneously. Relevant managerial 
implications are drawn for the hospitality industry, which is affected by the presence of online 
travel agencies that announce the daily rates offered by each competitor. 
Keywords: reference price; dynamic pricing; hotel pricing; price competition; price 
comparison 
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1. Introduction 
Suppose that Carol wants to book a hotel room and begins checking prices (hotel rates) over 
the Internet. After several searches, she realizes that there is a certain degree of price variability 
each time she checks. To judge the prices she is offered, she can recall the prices she may have 
seen in the past, the prices paid for rooms at the same hotel, and/or the prices charged by similar 
competing hotels. What she has seen or paid in the past, along with the prices of comparable 
hotels, will influence her price evaluation. 
The issue of customers’ price evaluations—how customers perceive prices and their 
variations—has become an important topic in hospitality management, particularly due to the 
widespread adoption of revenue management techniques by the lodging and travel industry. 
Dynamic pricing practices are now common and have become more feasible as Internet 
purchasing behavior has increased (Abrate et al., 2012). The widespread use of dynamic pricing 
is partly attributable to online tools, by which hotels can easily adjust prices in real time 
depending on the number of available rooms, the inventory and prices of close competitors, and 
other contextual indicators. However, though these pricing practices may benefit both sellers and 
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buyers, consumers may perceive dynamic pricing as unfair because it produces a variety of rates 
for what appear to be identical products, such as the same hotel room (Choi and Mattila, 2005).  
The reference price is the standard against which consumers evaluate current product prices 
to assess their attractiveness (Monroe, 1973). Reference price has been the subject of a large 
body of research by both economists and marketing scholars. It can be conceptualized as a price 
expectation based on customers’ memories of previous information (Mazumdar et al., 2005) or 
as the normative price—the price considered a “fair” charge for the product (Bolton et al., 2003; 
Campbell, 1999). 
Several studies have underlined the importance of including customers’ reference price in 
price response models (Lichenstein and Bearden 1989; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994). Moon, 
Russell and Duvvuri (2006), investigating how consumers encode prices, define three types of 
price response: i) comparing current prices to some function of observed past prices, i.e. 
memory-based reference price, ii) considering only the current distribution of prices, i.e. 
stimulus-based reference price and iii) considering just the observed price, i.e. not accounting for 
any source of reference price. An empirical analysis in their study shows that consumers using at 
least one sort of reference price are predominant. In both the reference conditions, memory-
based reference price and stimulus-based reference price, consumers weight price losses much 
more than price gains. This finding is consistent with the ideas that a reduced price has a strong 
effect on the reference price (Bambauer-Sachse and Massera, 2015) and that price losses loom 
larger than gains (Erdem et al., 2001). 
This study overrides the static determinations of the reference price, including (for the first 
time in a field study) the impact of competitors’ prices on the determination of the reference 
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price. This paper reconciles the relevant literature and then discusses the formation of the 
reference price based on sequences of past prices (i.e., the temporal dimension) and the 
theoretical foundations of the interrelated mechanisms between the reference price and the 
competition (i.e., the contextual dimension). Lab and field experiments are used to analyze the 
importance of each piece of past information in the formation of the reference price, not only 
from a static perspective but also by observing how the presence of different types of 
competition (i.e., simultaneous, leader–follower, and independent competitors) shapes the 
reference price. This paper thus explores both the internal and external dimensions of reference 
prices. Finally, several managerial implications for the international hospitality industry are 
drawn. 
This article applies experimental methods used in behavioral economics, as in Lee and Jang 
(2013b), to examine the above questions, so that external influencing factors (such as the impact 
of hotel location) are eliminated. The experimental economic methodology for dealing with 
consumer research questions was initially advocated by Ariely and Norton (2007) in cases where 
abstractions had to be used to capture the essential elements of the investigated phenomenon. 
More recently, Nicolau and Sellers (2012), uncovering the relation between willingness to pay 
and product bundling in hospitality, suggested that the link between experimental economics and 
tourism should be reinforced to detect nonrational economic behavior. 
2. Theory 
As observed by Rajendran and Tellis (1994), despite its intuitive appeal, reference price 
began to be formally modeled only in the late 1980s. The concept of reference price has been 
conceptualized through multiple theoretical approaches, leading to many different 
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operationalizations of the reference price construct (Rajendran and Tellis, 1994; Briesch et al., 
1997). To disentangle these various perspectives on the topic, a number of comprehensive 
literature reviews have attempted to integrate them. Mazumdar et al. (2005) present a review of 
published articles on reference price, dealing with i) the formation of reference price, ii) the 
retrieval and use of reference price, and iii) the influence of reference price on various purchase 
decisions and evaluations. Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) developed three empirical 
generalizations based on the research on reference price, observing that reference prices have a 
significant impact on consumer behavior concerning the evaluation of past prices, sensitivity to 
price losses, and purchase and brand decisions. 
Particularly relevant to our study is the contribution of Rajendran and Tellis (1994), who 
explore the temporal and contextual components of reference prices. They define the temporal 
dimension as the internal reference price—the prices faced by consumers on past purchase 
occasions and stored in their memory. The contextual component includes the different prices of 
products within the same product category (Mazumdar and Papatla, 1995). This formulation of 
reference price, based on the current price of some contextual good or service, is denoted the 
“external reference price” (Hardie et al., 1993; van Oest, 2013). It is important to note, however, 
that some empirical evidence suggests that these two mechanisms operate simultaneously and 
should be assessed jointly (Mazumdar and Papatla, 2000). 
The idea that individuals make judgments and choices based on reference prices can shed 
light on the tourism and hospitality relationship between prices and consumers’ response 
(Nicolau, 2011). The reference price concept in its multiple formulations becomes particularly 
relevant in contexts where favorable conditions for dynamic pricing occur, as the importance of 
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reference price increases with price instability (Winer, 1986). In sectors highly characterized by 
dynamic pricing scenarios (e.g., the airline, hospitality, and retail industries), consumers can 
frequently pay a different price for the same good or service, increasing the potential for 
perceptions of unfairness with respect to past purchases and contextual cues (Xia et al., 2004 
Karande and Magnini, 2011). Thus, along with the implementation of dynamic pricing, the 
reference price should be an essential component of managerial decisions concerning pricing, 
promotional strategies, and tactics.  
2.1. The temporal component: Reference prices and sequences of historical prices 
A key aspect of reference prices is the effect past price sequences may have on their 
determination. Although several studies suggest that time-based pricing strategies tend to be 
accepted by consumers, price discrimination may be perceived as unfair if standard conventions 
are violated (Huang et al., 2005; Wirtz and Kimes, 2007). Recent studies have thus assessed 
optimal dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects (Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2011). 
Surprisingly, perceptions of unfairness tend to remain stable across levels of brand class or 
segment, varying only across levels of familiarity with dynamic pricing strategies (Taylor and 
Kimes, 2011).  
Purchasing decisions have a temporal dimension; individuals usually form their reference 
prices after having observed sequences of prices (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Kalyanaram and 
Winer, 1995; Bell and Lattin, 2000) while collecting the available information (Thaler, 1985). As 
the hospitality industry is widely adopting dynamic pricing and revenue management techniques, 
the factors characterizing the formation and updating of reference prices must be investigated. 
What are the most important factors in a price sequence? Building on the literature, this article 
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identifies two factors in the sequences of past prices that can affect the current reference price: 
the first, average, and last price seen, and the highest and the lowest price. 
First, average, and last price. Dickson and Sawyer (1990) conducted a field study and found 
that the further in the past a price was, the less it contributed to the current reference price. 
Reference prices are often represented as a decaying weighted average of all past prices 
(Jacobson and Obermiller, 1990). The last (i.e., most recent) price is assumed to be the most 
influential, as in Nasiry and Popescu (2011). Contrary to these findings, however, Baucells et al. 
(2011) found in a financial setting that the first price was influential in the formation of reference 
prices; however, in their study, the first price was also the investor’s purchasing price. Grant, 
Xie, and Soman (2010) focused on the trend of previous prices and showed that people updated 
reference prices asymmetrically: they adapted their reference prices more quickly to “good 
news” and more slowly to “bad news.” 
Based on this literature, we propose that recent price information is more important than 
older price information in the determination of the reference price. We further posit that 
consumers adapt more rapidly to good news (i.e., a price reduction) than to bad news (i.e., a 
price increase).   
We thus derive the following hypotheses for the timeline factors: 
 
H1a. The order of the previously available prices affects reference price formation, with 
more recent price information being more salient for consumers. 
H1b. Upward and downward price fluctuations have different impacts, with the latter being 
more effective in affecting the reference price.  
7 
 
 
Highest and lowest price. Kahneman et al. (1993) introduced the magnitude of past peaks as 
part of the evaluation of a price sequence. The lowest price seems to be an important cue for 
reference prices (Viglia and Abrate, 2014), although high prices matter too, due to loss aversion 
(Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). Cowley (2008) shows that people tend to evaluate past 
experiences by performing a retrospective evaluation through “rose-colored” glasses, suggesting 
that good news (such as paying a low price) is given much more weight than other information. 
Dolansky and Vandenbosch (2013) show that people are willing to accept vendors with higher 
expected future prices if their historical price sequences are perceived to be less variable. The 
effect of sequence directions on preferences is thus mediated by perceptions of variability, which 
may increase perceived risk. 
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Accordingly, magnitude price considerations are also expected to shape reference prices, 
which leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. Extreme past peaks (i.e., the lowest and highest available prices) reduce the reference 
price. 
Knowing which prices matter more is relevant because hotel managers can incorporate these 
factors into their pricing strategies. The knowledge can also help educate consumers by making 
them more aware of the factors that drive their perceptions of “expensive” and “inexpensive.” 
2.2. The contextual component: Reference prices and competition 
When hoteliers are unable to convince customers that their product is worth more than the 
competitors’ through factors beyond price, price replaces brand, service, and physical property as 
the key driver of purchase decisions.  
The literature has extensively addressed how pricing perceptions and actions are driven by 
competition. Economists have long been describing competitive behaviors, mainly in terms of 
(non-cooperative) Nash behavior and (cooperative) leader–follower competition. Following 
Caves (1984), researchers began to describe the complexity of competitive rivalry, moving down 
the levels of analysis to the basic building block of competition: the competitive action–response 
dyads.  
Raju and Roy (1997) define three forms of competitive interaction: (i) simultaneous 
behavior, where firms adjust prices simultaneously; (ii) leader–follower behavior, where one 
firm acts as the leader (i.e., it does not react to its rival’s actions) while its rival follows changes 
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in the leader’s strategic behavior; and (iii) independent behavior, where each player takes its 
rival’s strategy as given and acts to maximize its own profits. 
Understanding price competition requires determining if and how firms respond to each 
other’s price decisions. Numerous empirical studies have established the existence of leader–
follower interactions among competitors (Roy et al., 1994, Kadiyali et al., 1998), and recent 
research has begun to establish the conditions under which price leadership–followership occurs 
and those under which firms set their prices independently (Roy and Raju, 2011). Competition in 
the hospitality business has been observed to be intense due to the adoption of revenue 
management. Hotels typically define and adjust their prices by monitoring the rates applied 
within their so-called “competitive set.” This adjustment is often automatic. Rate shoppers and 
whole sellers track competitors’ room rates across all distribution channels, integrating revenue 
management systems (Mauri, 2012). This severe competition appears to be especially 
remarkable in agglomerations of large cities (Lee and Jang, 2012), with rapid price responses 
(Becerra et al., 2013) and implications for growth (Falk and Hagsten, 2015).  
The role of competition in pricing leads us to a third hypothesis, concerning the link 
between reference price formation and competitors’ action-response dyads. This study explores 
the influence on reference price formation when simultaneous patterns occur, when leader–
follower behavior occurs, and when no action–response dyad is present (i.e., when two 
competing hotels act independently). Moon and Voss (2009) portrays that consumers incorporate 
not only the price suggested by the firm, but also the reference prices for the entire product 
category into their assessment of price fairness. Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004) add that, when 
competitors adjust prices simultaneously, the consumer’s perception of unfairness increases. If 
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this principle holds in the hospitality sector, it would imply that unfairness perceptions arise (and 
thus the reference price decreases) as a function of hotels’ responses to each other’s price 
decisions. We seek to experimentally validate this proposition. A study that manipulates the 
degree to which hotels respond to each other’s price decisions can be useful due to the increasing 
number of websites that show charts of competitors’ prices (Dreschsler and Natter, 2011) for 
certain types of products. These websites, such as NexTag.com, allow customers to increase the 
information available to them while evaluating prices, which carries implications for sales. We 
thus propose the following:  
H3. The degree to which hotels respond to each other’s price decisions is an inverse 
function of the reference price.  
Drawing on the findings of Lee and Jang (2013a), we consider situations in which hotels are 
not differentiated by quality because the outcome of simultaneous price adjustments would be 
asymmetric and not perceived as comparable by consumers. We also isolate other possible 
contextual factors such as the location of the hotel, which appears of paramount importance in 
terms of the attractiveness and density of the area (Rigall-I Torrent et al., 2011), and the impact 
of social comparison, which was shown to have a tremendous effect on the reference price 
(Viglia and Abrate, 2014). 
Integrating all the above, we can derive and sketch our conceptual model, which forms the 
cornerstone of our work. Figure 1 presents the two components, temporal and contextual, that 
impact the reference price.  
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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Experiment 1 focuses on the temporal dimension, while Experiment 2 sheds light on the 
contextual dimension. Below, we describe the methodology used and explain why we 
operationalized the reference price as the fair price. 
3. Method 
We use a lab experiment and field study to isolate the relevant factors and identify the causal 
relationships concerning the effect of pricing policies. These methodologies have often been 
used in hospitality research, particularly to measure the effect of monetary and pricing strategies 
(Lynn and Lynn, 2003; Liang, 2014). 
Consider a consumer who observes a sequence of prices Pi, i = 1, …, n. She observes one 
unit of a product in period 1 at price Pi, forming an initial reference price. In the subsequent 
periods, she observes other pieces of information, allowing her to update her reference price. 
Reference prices may be measured indirectly, by observing consumer choices. Such inferences 
are noisy, however, as they are affected by other factors.  
 Rajendran (2009) proposed an operationalization of the reference price that depended on 
whether it was conceptualized based on the notion of expected or fair price. While the expected 
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reference price is elicited as the “estimate of the likely price,” the fair reference price is elicited 
as the “price above which it would be too high and below which it would be a good deal.” This 
article elicits reference prices within the fairness conceptualization because, as shown in 
Rajendran (2009), consumers are becoming increasingly concerned with fairness and good value 
when retrieving reference prices from past prices. Thus, this study’s subjects must state the price 
at which they would feel “neither happy nor unhappy about the purchase.” Baucells et al. (2011) 
and Arkes et al. (2008) adopt this approach by asking subjects about the price at which they 
would feel “neither happy nor unhappy about the purchase,” the premise being that a positive 
(negative) price comparison generates positive (negative) feelings.  
4. Experiment 1 (lab experiment) 
Experiment 1 measures the impact of the past price factors, in sequences, on the reference 
price (internal reference price). The sequences are designed to favor pair-to-pair comparisons. 
This experiment tests H1a, H1b, and H2. 
 
 
4.1. Subjects 
The subjects of the experiment were 60 undergraduate students enrolled in a course in 
Online Marketing at Pompeu Fabra University (Spain) who, after a pre-test on their familiarity 
and experience with purchasing online hospitality services, were invited to participate in the 
study through an e-mail invitation in the lab. The students’ average age was 22, with a range 
from 21 to 28. Subjects received a fixed payment of €5 for their participation. Before receiving 
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the financial reward, students were asked to indicate whether the instructions were clear on a 
scale from 1 (“completely unclear”) to 5 (“completely clear”). The average score was 4.3, 
suggesting that the subjects understood the presented scenarios quite clearly. The average 
processing time was 30 minutes. 
4.2. Instructions and procedure 
The subjects were asked to observe sequences of prices charged by a single hotel with no 
other additional information given. They were presented with the following text: “You already 
checked the Internet for a three-star hotel and you found a different price offer each day. Only 
after observing the different prices—you have no other information—you ask yourself which 
price you think is neither expensive nor cheap for the booking.” There was a four-second delay 
before each new price was added to the sequence, from the first price (on the left of the 
sequence) to the last price (on the right of the sequence). To reproduce a different number of 
previously recalled prices, we varied the length of each sequence of prices from between three 
and eight periods. The total number of sequences presented to the subjects was 24, and their 
order was randomized. The subjects monitored the sequences of prices; at the end of every 
sequence, they were asked to write the price they perceived as “neither expensive nor cheap.” 
The variability in the prices of the predesigned sequences was consistent with the use of dynamic 
pricing in the hoteling industry (Abrate et al., 2012). A screenshot of the experimental scenario is 
provided in the appendix. 
4.3. Design and factors 
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Based on the framework above, this study proposes five within-subjects factors that can 
influence reference prices: the first price (P1), the last price (Pn), the average price (∑ 𝑃𝑖/𝑖=1,…,𝑛
𝑛), the highest price (maxi=1,…, n  Pi ), and the lowest price (mini=1, …, n Pi ). The final design 
consists of 24 price sequences, creating 12 pairs, as shown in Table 1. Column Pi contains the ith 
price of each sequence; price units are in euros. The two sequences in each pair are identical to 
each other with respect to all five factors but one. For example, sequences 1 and 2 share the same 
last price (100), the same average price (100), the same highest price (150), and the same lowest 
price (50), varying only in the first price, which is higher in sequence 1 (150 versus 50). Table 1 
presents the 24 sequences, along with the average response and the standard deviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The 24 Price Sequences Used in Experiment 1 
 
Factor investigated Seq. k P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 Avg. 
Rk 
Sd 
Rk 
 
First price 1 150 100 50 100     109.2 20.4 
2 50 100 150 100     97.4 15.4 
3 150 100 50 100 60 100 140 100 120.6 16.9 
4 50 100 150 100 140 100 60 100 101.8 11.2 
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Last price 5 100 50 100 150     96.4 15.6 
 6 100 150 100 50     85.7 15.1 
 7 100 50 70 100 150 130   95.7 13.4 
 8 100 150 130 100 50 70   85.7 12.8 
Average price 9 50 100 100      82.7 11.0 
 10 50 50 100      76.8 8.4 
 11 50 100 150 140 140 140 140 120 122.8 10.6 
 12 50 100 150 100 100 100 100 120 114.0 12.5 
Lowest price 13 150 100 100 100 100    109.4 14.8 
 14 150 150 100 50 100    106.3 17.1 
 15 150 130 100 100 100 100 100 100 129.7 9.74 
 16 150 130 100 120 120 100 60 100 122.8 13.3 
Highest price 17 50 50 100 150 100    78.9 14.2 
 18 50 100 100 100 100    101.5 11.6 
 19 100 50 100 60 100 140 100  91.0 12.9 
 20 100 50 100 90 100 110 100  101.7 12.8 
Dashed hope vs. False alarm 21 100 50 100      89.6 13.6 
22 100 150 100      101.8 14.8 
Early vs. Late 23 100 50 100 150 100    95.7 12.3 
24 100 150 100 50 100    103.6 11.9 
 
4.4. Results 
Table 2 presents the influence of each factor analyzed.  
 
 
 
Table 2. The Effect of the Different Factors 
 
 Our study BWW 
Average 
First price 1–2 
0.12 
(0.000) 
3–4 
0.19 
(0.000) 
 
 0.48 
Last price 
 
5–6 
0.11 
(0.000) 
7–8 
0.17 
(0.000) 
 
 0.21 
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Average (intermediate) prices 9–10 
0.12 
(0.000) 
11–12 
0.26 
(0.000) 
 
 0.09 
Low price 
 
13–14 
0.06 
(0.098) 
15–16 
0.17 
(0.000) 
 
 0.06 
High price 
 
17–18 
-0.45 
(0.000) 
19–20 
-0.36 
(0.000) 
 
-0.09 
    
Each entry indicates the pair of sequences k of Table 1, the unit effect that a change in the row factor has on 
Rk+1 −Rk, and the p-values of a t-test on the difference of the mean. The BWW Average column presents the 
results obtained by Baucells et al. 2011 in their experiment. 
 
To interpret these values, consider the pair of sequences 1 and 2. The elicited reference 
prices are R1 = 109.2 and R2 = 97.4. Dividing this difference by 100 (the difference between the 
two initial prices) shows how every unit increase in the first price affects the reference price.  
The final column presents the results obtained in finance by Baucells et al. (2011), or BWW. 
This study compares low prices with their high prices because, from an investor’s perspective, a 
high price is a gain whereas, from a consumer’s perspective, a gain is the presence of a low 
price.  
The analysis produces the following results for each group of factors: 
 First, average, and last price. The first price creates a reference point for 
consumers that allow them to initially evaluate a service. BWW found a stronger effect 
because the first price was also the purchase price. For consumer prices, the influence of 
the first price on the formation of reference prices is more moderate but more relevant 
than the last price. As for the average, recalling that, in the design of these pairs the first 
and last prices of the two sequences are the same, the pair comparison measures the 
effect of both the average price and the average of the intermediate prices ∑
𝑃𝑖 
𝑛−2
𝑛−1
𝑖=2  . In 
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the calculation of the unit price, this study uses the latter. The effect of the average price 
is a driver of the formation of reference points. 
 Lowest and highest price. Recalling that the average is the same for every 
sequence, these two factors measure the effect of past peaks within a price sequence. This 
study finds that strong past peaks tend to reduce the reference price (see the sequence 
pairs 13–14, 15–16, 17–18, and 19–20 in Table 1). Our results show that the past peaks 
are even more relevant than in BWW.  
To draw inferences about the effect of this trend, we examined an effect that can be labeled 
“hope vs. alarm.” We produced two series that started and ended at the same price level with a 
price increase followed by a decrease and a price decrease followed by an increase, respectively 
(see Table 1, sequences 21 and 22). In sequence 21, the initial price is 100, the intermediate price 
decreases to 50 (hope), and then reverts to the original price of 100. In sequence 22, the initial 
price is 100, the intermediate price increases to 150 (alarm), and then reverts to the original price 
of 100. The increases and decreases are of the same magnitude (50): in sequence 21 the reference 
price is 89.6, while in sequence 22 it is 101.8. 
The difference in reference points is highly significant in the sequence pair studied (t (58) = 
3.32, p < .05 for the 21–22 pair). Following the same variation in the exposed prices (±50), we 
found that the sensitivity of the reference price is more intense when facing downward 
fluctuations than when facing upward ones. In the “alarm” case, the reference price increases by 
only 1.8 on average against the baseline price (100), while, in the “hope” case, the reference 
price decreases by 10.4 on average. These results suggest that subjects are more prone to adapt to 
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price reductions (the transient “good news” brought by hope) than to price increases (the 
transient “bad news” brought by alarm). 
To better disentangle the analysis on the first vs. the last effect, we measured an effect that 
can be labeled “early vs. late price effect.” In sequence 23, the price drops and then rises, while 
in sequence 24, the price rises and then drops. The pair comparison yields a significant 
difference (t (58) = 2.25, p <.05) in reference prices: people seem more influenced by early 
prices. The difference of 7.9 between average values in sequence 23 and 24 implies that early 
prices set a reference that is difficult to change. 
4.5. Discussion 
The results on the factors guiding reference prices are as follows. On the one hand, H1a 
receives partial support because the first price has a larger impact on the reference price, an 
effect further confirmed by the “early vs. late” sequences. The weight given to initial information 
appears to be greater than that given to recent information. On the other hand, H1b is fully 
supported: consumers are much more reactive to price decreases than price increases. The impact 
of magnitude factors (H2) is large, but it is asymmetrical and depends on a specific set of 
analyzed sequences. This study finds a strong negative effect on reference prices when a high 
price is present, which is further accentuated in the social case. Recalling that, by construction, 
the presence of a high price implies lower values for the remaining prices, a possible explanation 
for this result is that consumers do not take the high outlier into account when forming the 
reference price. 
5. Experiment 2 (field experiment) 
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Experiment 2 investigates the joint effect of two competing hotels on the reference price. 
Measuring current prices for contextual goods allows a testing of the impact of the external 
reference price. The new contribution here concerns the impact of the competitive action–
response dyads (H3). Experiment 2 also sought empirical validation of the results obtained in the 
lab (Experiment 1) for the lodging industry.  
5.1. Subjects 
We conducted the field study at the five-star hotel Princesa Sofia in Barcelona (Spain) in 
August 2013 with real hotel clients under conditions of higher involvement than in the lab study. 
After a pre-test on clients’ familiarity with and experience in purchasing online hospitality 
services, 104 random clients agreed to participate. The average age of the clients was 43, with a 
range of 23 to 71. The average processing time was 21 minutes. Five randomly selected 
participants received a 25-euro mobile phone voucher for their participation. 
5.2. Instructions and procedure 
To measure the impact of competition on the reference price, clients were asked to observe 
sequences of prices that were actually charged for one night in a single room by the study hotel 
and by a close competitor (Eurostars Barcelona Design) on Booking.com. Aside from the 
competition part, which saw the addiction of a new operator, the framing was exactly the same 
as in Experiment 1. Clients were presented with the following text: “You are observing the 
prices of two competing hotels of a similar quality on a daily basis. One hotel presents prices that 
are an average of 20 euros higher than the other. Only after observing how the sequence of 
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different prices evolved—you have no other information—you ask yourself which price you 
think is neither expensive nor cheap for an average booking.”  
As in Experiment 1, there was a four-second delay before each new price (here, a pair of prices) 
was added to the sequence from the first price pair (on the left of the sequence) to the last price 
pair (on the right of the sequence). Each pair of sequences was five prices long; to preserve 
orthogonality, we kept the first and the last price of each pair constant, allowing us to isolate the 
impact of each factor. A total of six pairs were presented to the subjects; the order of their 
sequences was randomized. Although the prices shown are the prices that were actually charged 
by the two hotels for a night in a single room, with discounts in line with Nusair et al. (2010), we 
artificially designed the sequences in each pair to present the three treatments (i.e., possible 
forms of competitions): there were (i) two pairs of sequences where synchronized patterns occur, 
(ii) two pairs of sequences where leader–followers occur with a time lag, and (iii) two pairs of 
sequences with no action–response dyad. Because the subjects saw all the treatments, our design 
was within-subjects. Due to the slightly more complicated design (relative to Experiment 1), we 
presented prices graphically to allow participants to better see the price patterns between the two 
competing hotels. Additionally, for the sake of clarity, we rounded out the prices on 
Booking.com to keep the price comparison easy to present and understand graphically. As in 
Experiment 1, prices were presented on a computer screen. Table 3 summarizes the different 
price sequences, showing the average reference price stated, along with the related standard 
deviation for each pair. If in one manipulation the average reference price is seen as significantly 
higher or lower than in another, the condition affected the movement of the reference price up or 
down. 
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Table 3.  Pairs of Sequences Used in Experiment 2  
Treatment Seq. k P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Customers’ reference price 
Average                        St. dev. 
Simultaneous 1 110 100 110 120 110  
93.13 
 
6.16 
 2 90 80 90 100 90   
Simultaneous  3 110 120 110 100 110  
93.03 
 
6.05 
 4 90 100 90 80 90   
Leader–follower with time lag 5 110 100 120 110 110  
94.13 
 
6.74 
 6 90 90 80 100 90   
Leader–follower with time lag 7 110 120 100 110 110  
95.77 
 
6.34 
 8 90 90 100 80 90   
Independent prices 9 110 120 100 110 110  
97.16 
 
5.65 
 10 90 80 100 90 90   
Independent prices 11 110 110 100 120 110  
98.89 
 
5.30 
 12 90 90 100 80 90   
Prices in euros 
 
The graphical interface used for Experiment 2 is provided in the appendix.  
Clients monitored the sequences of prices and, at the end of the sequence, were asked to 
select the price they perceived as “neither expensive nor cheap”, according the aforementioned 
method.  
5.3. Results 
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The final two columns of Table 3 present the average value of the reference price and the 
standard deviation for each pair of sequences.  
In all the sequence pairs, the average stated reference price is closer to the average price of 
the cheapest hotel (90) than to the average price of the most expensive one (110): in four of the 
six pairs of sequences presented in Table 3, there was no significant difference between the 
reference price and the average price of the cheapest hotel. The only exceptions are the sequence 
pairs 9–10 and 11–12, where the clients’ stated reference price was significantly higher than the 
average price of the lowest hotel (t (103) = 2.25, p < .05). 
To measure the significance of the differences of the three competitive patterns in terms of 
the reference price, we used ANOVA repeated measures, as all sample subjects saw the three 
different conditions (within-subjects treatment). The reference price differed statistically 
significantly between treatments (F (2, 206) = 7.03, p < .005). We disentangled the impact of 
each specific treatment using post-hoc tests. Bonferroni correction revealed that the average 
reference price in the leader–follower treatment was slightly higher than the reference price in 
the synchronized condition but not enough to hold statistical significance (p = .2); however, the 
independent price condition presented a higher reference price than the synchronized condition 
(p < .005) and the leader–follower condition (p < .01). Therefore, we can conclude that an 
independent pricing system between the two competitors presents the highest reference price. 
Figure 2 graphically shows the average reference price along with the standard error for each 
condition.  
Figure 2. Average Reference Price across Conditions 
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5.4. Discussion 
The second experiment explored how different pricing strategies for hotels in competitive 
industries affect the reference price. The reference prices observed would suggest that the 
optimal strategy for competing hotels would be to not adjust prices simultaneously. Aside from 
the simultaneous adjustment of prices, we considered the effect of leader–follower strategies 
(i.e., when one competitor adjusts the price based on the other’s move). We show that consumers 
tend to lower the reference price if there are two similar price moves between competitors, 
stating a lower reference price with respect to a situation of independent price moves. These 
results support H3, suggesting that unfairness inferences are made when one hotel adjusts its 
prices based on the prices of another.  
Interestingly, the reference price stated by consumers tends to be closer to the cheapest 
hotel, confirming a finding of Experiment 1: when forming their reference price, people do not 
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take into account only the average of past prices; they are also influenced by past peaks; people 
generally adapt more to lower prices (and fluctuations) than to higher ones. 
Experiment 2 should be seen as a first step towards an understanding of reference-price 
formation in competitive scenarios; it cannot claim to provide a full picture of all the subtle price 
differences in real environments. 
6. Conclusion  
6.1. Theoretical and practical implications 
This study contributes to the pricing research on experience products by conducting research 
in an experimental setting, as advocated by Adhikari, Basu, and Raj (2013). 
The reference point framework is relatively well analyzed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991); however, a sound, in-depth application in the hotel industry is 
needed. Chen and Schwartz (2008) have underlined that price structures and room rate change 
patterns affect consumers’ room rate expectations and thus their propensity to book. Referring to 
the two aspects we tested, people tend to overestimate lower prices in forming their reference 
point and are influenced by early prices, which act as a milestone in the determination of the 
reference price.  
The dynamic nature of reference price formation has to be related to the types of competitive 
games being played among industry operators. As Netessine and Shumsky (2005) theorized, 
competitors fight in games that can be described as “horizontal.” The authors discuss show an 
operator experiences a substantial revenue loss, as high-fare customers receive a higher surplus 
from a competitor. Relating these elements to our findings on reference price formation suggests 
25 
 
that competition and its subsequent price-related behaviors jeopardize not only price perceptions 
but also revenue extraction from the highest-value customer segments. 
Our findings suggest that hotels should be very cautious in lowering their rates to affect the 
reference price, even for short periods. As theoretically suggested by Kopalle, Rao, and 
Assunção (1996), we show how pricing and discounting policies affect reference price 
formation. The more often and longer hotel room rates are discounted, the more likely the 
discounted rate is to become the reference price, and the more difficult it will be for hotels to 
recover their value in the minds of consumers. As described by Hunt (2005), a pricing and 
revenue management expert, less mature companies tend to enter into price wars more easily and 
use discounts and aggressive pricing tactics in an uncontrolled way. Such companies will 
jeopardize reference price levels.   
We also find that earlier prices in a sequence are strongly influential. This finding appears to 
be more controversial, as many authors affirm the crucial role of more recent prices. One 
possible explanation is provided by Danziger and Segev (2006), who observe that, although field 
studies report robust last-price effects, laboratory experiments do not. They argue that the 
stronger impact of the last price in field studies is caused by the fact that consumers rarely see 
the prices. By contrast, in laboratory experiments such as Experiment 1, prices are viewed within 
seconds or minutes, and early prices therefore seem more recent. This difference between the lab 
and the field is shrinking due to the influence of the Internet: the relatively new Google hotel 
finder tool and the increased presence of online price charts (Drechsler and Natter, 2011) allow 
customers to easily monitor trends in past prices and competitors’ prices.  
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Aside from memory, reference prices are also influenced by many factors (e.g., decision 
delays and social comparison). Our design includes many of the factors that may matter but may 
have excluded some others.  
The second experiment extends the boundaries of price acceptability in terms of fairness to 
different competing contexts, showing how the price perceived as fair also depends on the price 
strategies used by competitors. Our findings show that people tend to “punish” (i.e., reduce the 
reference price) when competing hotels adjust their prices simultaneously or with a time lag, 
unlike when prices between competitors evolve independently. This finding supports our 
hypothesis and the theoretical work of Xia et al. (2004): when competitors adjust prices 
simultaneously, consumers’ perception of unfairness increases.  
Hotels should consider these findings when implementing price strategies. The awareness of 
reference dependence may facilitate the understanding of online consumer behavior when 
shaping pricing, especially based on competitors’ moves. If prices are adjusted independently, 
our findings suggest that dynamic pricing strategies have little influence on reference prices, 
indicating that revenue management and consumers now accept time-based pricing practices. 
Nonetheless, boundary conditions apply in markets where competitors adjust prices 
simultaneously. The negative effect on reference prices highlights how simultaneous pricing 
adjustments between hotels may induce feelings of unease, thereby leading to the perception of 
unfairness as well as the lowering of the reference price.  
Furthermore, observing sequences with extreme prices, people tend to punish high prices 
(losses from a consumer perspective), confirming the prospect theory hypothesis that losses loom 
larger than gains. To limit this effect, the optimal strategy for hotels would be to reduce price 
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variability, as maintaining stable rates reduces the risk that the reference price will be replaced. 
The impact of reference prices should be considered when designing new pricing mechanisms 
such as pay-what-you-want (Johnson and Cui, 2013) and price bidding (Rong-Da Liang, 2014). 
6.2. Limitations and future research 
This paper is not without limitations. The first experiment involved student participants and 
service purchase scenarios. We are aware that presenting student participants with a hypothetical 
design in a lab is less than ideal. We therefore analyzed data from the field before making 
conclusions. A major limitation is that we presented customers with only two competing hotels 
with pre-designed sequences of prices to elicit the main effect, whereas realistic online 
environments present multiple alternatives and prices. The selection of a competing hotel with a 
slightly lower average price was a choice based on the location of that hotel, which could also be 
considered geographically close. In addition to the competitive structure, reference prices are 
influenced by many other factors, such as decision delays, social comparisons, loyalty programs, 
segment types, destination characteristics, and individual differences. While the study designs 
allowed us to isolate some of the factors that may impact reference prices, they excluded others. 
For example, on top of the main trends, there were individual fixed effects of respondents for the 
findings in both Experiment 1 and 2. Possible explanations for these findings appear in Nicolau 
(2012) and Baucells and Hwang (2014), who show that people are heterogeneous in their loss 
aversion and price responsiveness, respectively. An analysis of the determinants of individual 
differences, which is not the goal of this study, is left for future investigation. 
In the second experiment, two of the scenarios presented to subjects (sequences 7–8 and 11–
12 in Table 3 and Appendix B) appear to be similar though intended to represent the leader–
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follower condition and the independent condition, respectively. The results of the experiment 
confirm the anomaly of this case. As Table 3 shows, sequences 7–8 present a higher reference 
price, similar to those of the independent condition. Another limitation concerns the 
operationalization of the reference price. While we stress that the fair price is a widely used 
construct for the reference price (Arkes, 2008; Bolton et al., 2003; Campbell, 1999; Rajendran, 
2009), we acknowledge that the operationalization of the reference price with multiple hotels, as 
in Experiment 2, is not straightforward. Our elicitation “the price you would think is neither 
expensive nor cheap for an average booking” is only one possible elicitation to be drawn from 
the literature and should be both replicated and improved upon. 
One possible avenue for further testing is to examine whether these findings hold even when 
hotels are able to provide rational reasons (aside from maximizing profits) for why prices move 
simultaneously between competing hotels (e.g., peak days, seasonality, events). Future research 
should also explore if these effects hold in other industries where the use of dynamic pricing is 
increasing (e.g., the retail industry).  
Finally, to reconcile the different conceptualizations of the reference price, it would be 
interesting to investigate if an elicitation of the reference price other than in its fairness 
conceptualization would generate a different effect on the reference price. We imagine that an 
operationalization closer to the expected price conceptualization would tell an entirely different 
story. In fact, in this case, people may set aside unfairness considerations to focus on rational 
considerations from past prices and the behavior of competitors. 
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Appendix A. Screenshot of experimental scenario (Experiment 1). 
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Appendix B. Graphical representation of sequences seen by participants in Experiment 2. 
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